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Corruption Survey in Croatia:  
Survey Confidentiality and Trust in Institutions 
 
Abstract: 
In an attempt to explore the linkages between corruption surveys, underreporting corruption 
experiences and causes of reluctance to report corruption, this paper provides insight into 
solutions applied to mitigate the underreporting risks in surveying corruption experiences in 
Croatia. Based on the “Survey on use of public services and public integrity” conducted in 
Croatia in the summer of 2010, the issue of underreporting corruption is assessed here 
with a two-fold approach. The study first discusses the various aspects of the survey 
methodology applied, where the main concerns were the willingness of respondents to 
report corruption and their perceptions regarding risk of personal data misuse. Potential 
reluctance to admit involvement in corruption as a criminal act might be driven by a fear of 
subsequent surveillance or investigation. Further, we investigate the concerns expressed by 
respondents regarding the misuse of data, in particular with regard to protecting anonymity. 
The other issue arises from the direct survey results and refers to citizens’ attitudes and 
reasons for (not) reporting crime to official institutions. The analysis particularly focuses on 
reporting corruption experiences, both formally and informally. The results of the survey 
show a very high level of citizens’ opportunism and lack of public trust in institutions that 
might impede anti-corruption efforts in Croatia. 
 
Keywords: corruption experience, trust in institutions, reporting crime, Croatia 
JEL classification: O17, K42, H83 
 
 
Ispitivanje korupcije u Hrvatskoj:  
povjerljivost ankete i povjerenje u institucije 
 
Saetak: 
Rad polazi od postojeæe literature o anketama o korupciji, metodološkom problemu 
odbijanja odgovora o stvarnim iskustvima korupcije te o potencijalnim uzrocima 
neprijavljivanja korupcije. Studija opisuje konkretnu problematiku u anketnom ispitivanju 
korupcije i primijenjena rješenja kako bi se smanjio rizik davanja odgovora koji podcjenjuju 
stvarna korupcijska iskustva graðana. Temeljem “Ankete o korištenju javnih usluga i 
poštenju u javnim slubama” provedenoj u Hrvatskoj u ljeto 2010. godine, u radu se 
problem neprijavljivanja korupcije razmatra s dva razlièita stajališta. Prvo se analizira 
spremnost anketiranih da potvrde svoje sudjelovanje u korupcijskom djelu, pri èemu 
odbijanje davanja odgovora moe biti uzrokovano strahom od nadzora i praæenja ili 
kriminalistièke istrage. U radu se ispituje i percipirani rizik zlouporabe osobnih podataka i 
mišljenje ispitanika o zaštiti anonimnosti. Drugo istraivaèko pitanje izravno proizlazi iz 
rezultata ankete, a obraðuje stavove ispitanika i razloge neprijavljivanja kriminala slubenim 
institucijama. Zasebno se analiziraju formalno i neformalno prijavljivanje sluèajeva 
korupcije. Rezultati ankete pokazuju visoku razinu oportunizma graðana i nedostatak 
povjerenja u institucije, što moe predstavljati prepreku uèinkovitoj provedbi antikorupcijske 
politike u Hrvatskoj. 
 
Kljuène rijeèi: korupcijska iskustva, povjerenje u institucije, prijavljivanje kaznenih djela, 
Hrvatska 
JEL klasifikacija: O17, K42, H83 
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1 Introduction 
 
This paper provides insight into solutions applied to mitigate the underreporting risks in 
surveying corruption experiences in Croatia. Based on the “Survey on use of public 
services and public integrity”1 conducted in Croatia, we have analyzed a selection of 
questions and answers related to reporting corruption experiences. The survey was 
conducted in the summer of 2010 by face-to-face interviews with Croatian citizens, and 
provides data analysis of 3005 questionnaires. The methodology employed was carefully 
pre-tested in a pilot survey conducted in June 2010 on a net sample of 150 respondents. 
The pilot tested whether the option of self-administrated responses to questions related to 
corruption experiences would increase the response rate, and whether the respondents 
were concerned about the anonymity of the survey (Budak and Rajh, 2010). This research 
adds to the Budak and Rajh (2010) preliminary study of the pilot survey, which provided 
rather limited insight into the trust in institutions. Employing the data collected in the 
large nationally representative survey, this analysis extends to the public’s confidence in 
institutions when reporting crime in Croatia. 
 
Adding to the existing literature (Treisman, 2007; Jensen, Li and Rahman, 2007), when 
discussing the survey methodology, our main concerns were the willingness of 
respondents to report corruption and their perceived risk of personal data misuse. 
Potential reluctance to admit involvement in corruption as a criminal act might be 
driven by a fear of surveillance or investigation that might follow. Further, we have 
investigated the views expressed by respondents regarding the misuse of data, in 
particular with regard to protecting confidentiality. Due to the topic of the survey, the 
anonymity of the respondents was protected more than requested by standard market 
research procedures.  
 
The issue of underreporting corruption is assessed here with a two-fold approach. The 
first one considers respondents’ underreporting corruption experiences in the survey 
from the point of view of survey methodology applied. The other one arises from the 
direct survey results and refers to the issue of not reporting corruption experiences to 
official institutions. Thus the results of the survey enabled us to gain interesting insight 
into the public’s trust in institutions in Croatia.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the rationale for exploring 
the linkages between extensive corruption surveys, underreporting corruption experiences, 
and potential causes of reluctance to report corruption both in surveys and to the 
institutions. This background leads us to the main research questions: (i) whether 
respondents were reluctant to answer sensitive questions and why, and (ii) would 
Croatian citizens report crime, for what reasons, and which institutions they trust. The 
third section deals with the methodology and data used in the corruption survey 
                                                 
1 This research stemmed from the project “Household survey on experience of corruption and other forms of crime in 
Croatia”, which was based on a grant agreement between the Institute of Economics, Zagreb and UNODC. The views 
and results presented in this paper, however, are the authors’ responsibility only. 
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conducted in Croatia, while the detailed empirical analysis results are elaborated in 
section four. The last section concludes with policy recommendations and suggests 
possible directions of further research. 
 
 
2 Rationale Background 
 
Corruption is a world-wide phenomenon that has raised considerable research interest 
within the fields of sociological, political and economic studies. It has been investigated 
both theoretically and empirically from various aspects (Jain, 2001; Tanzi, 1998); 
however, the true prevalence of corruption still remains unrevealed (Kaufmann, 1997). 
The clandestine nature of this illegal activity together with different notions about what 
actions should be considered corruption are challenging researchers and policy-makers to 
improve the methodology of corruption-related research (Sampford et al., 2006).  
 
The prevalence of corruption is usually measured by perception indices presenting 
subjective opinions on the perceived level of corruption.2 Those estimates might be 
influenced by general public views, reports on recent corruption scandals, cultural or 
historical heritage, and are rarely supported by corruption experiences of the 
respondents. Complementary to measuring corruption perceptions, up-to-date surveys on 
corruption experiences provide the most effective tool to get deeper insight into the 
scope and modes of corrupt activities. Information on corruption experiences is valuable, 
yet would not provide reliable data on the volume of actual corruption transactions and 
corresponding financial losses. Estimates reached by extrapolating reported corruption 
experiences to the whole sector, society group or nation are not accurate since the 
potential underreporting problem might significantly affect results. Further, the real 
extent of corruption is not measurable because there is no evidence on how many 
corrupt actions committed have ever been revealed. However, survey data on corruption 
experiences might serve as a valuable indication of sources and modes of corruption, thus 
enabling anti-corruption strategies to be more precisely targeted and therefore more 
effective. 
 
This clear objective of exploring both corruption experiences and corruption perceptions 
has boosted the number of corruption surveys conducted in the last decade (Treisman, 
2007). Quantitative measurement of corruption experiences in surveys has become 
popular since more sophisticated and appropriate survey methodologies have been 
applied (Reinikka and Svensson, 2006). However, the methodology of surveying 
corruption is still undergoing critiques, calling for further improvements. One of the 
major issues is the problem of overestimating perceived corruption prevalence opposed 
to the underreported corruption experiences. Underreporting behavior is broadly 
explained within the cost-benefit theoretical model, and research studies mostly discuss 
                                                 
2 Two widely used corruption perception measures are Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International 
(www.transparency.org) and Control of Corruption as one of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (developed by the 
World Bank Institute, www.worldbank.org). 
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the problem of underreporting in the context of shadow economy (Schneider and Enste, 
2002). There is a body of literature on the factors that deter people from officially 
reporting corruption (Zipparo, 1998), yet very few studies on how to deal with this 
problem in surveying corruption experiences are available. The recent study of Jensen et 
al. (2007) provides a new concept of gathering useful information from nonresponse and 
false response to corruption-related questions in firm-level corruption surveys, while 
Reinikka and Svensson (2006) have discussed how to overcome misreporting problems in 
surveying educational and health institutions and firms. Besides the general lack of 
literature on this topic, the above-mentioned contributions are related to surveying firms 
and institutions, and to our knowledge, no such analysis has been made for surveying the 
corruption experiences of the general public. For the latter, it would be interesting to 
explore the reasons behind personal reluctance to report corruption. 
 
Citizens in Croatia are aware that living in an information society in some segments 
leads “towards a surveillance society” (Radovan, 2006). This subjective notion, combined 
with memories of the past undemocratic regime, could seriously prevent respondents 
from reporting corruption experiences. Citizens are very much aware that all data and 
information collected will be electronically processed and kept for records. All gathered 
information could be (mis)used for further surveillance, manipulation and even 
prosecuting people (Radovan and Jugo, 2006). Studies have shown that U.S. citizens have 
concerns about privacy and confidentiality even in returning census forms (Singer, Van 
Hoewyk and Neugebauer, 2003). A low response rate can skew the findings of surveys 
dealing with sensitive issues, such as opinion research about surveillance and privacy 
(Haggerty and Gazso, 2005). Survey reporting on corruption is particularly sensitive 
because both sides participating in corruption (bribe-givers and bribe-takers) are subject 
to criminal prosecution.3 If reported a posteriori, i.e., once a corruption transaction is 
realized, there might be fear of consequent surveillance to gather more evidence on 
corrupt officials or even investigation and prosecution. This would not only induce the 
underreporting of corruption but also increase the refusal rate and thus bias the survey 
results.  
 
Theoretical thought underpins trust in the institutions as a key component of social 
capital (Nooteboom, 2006; Berggren and Jordahl, 2006). As public opinion is a product 
of social capital and institutional set-up, a notable portion of public opinion about 
corruption and other forms of crime is being formed according to citizens’ confidence in 
the institutions that should ensure their security. A part of the survey collects data on 
sharing information about corruption experiences and reporting them. It provides a 
unique source of information about real and perceived trust in institutions responsible 
for dealing with corruption. Public awareness about corruption represents an important 
pillar of anti-corruption efforts. If the attitudes of citizens are not clearly in line with the 
promoted zero tolerance towards corruption, room is made for acts of corruption to 
emerge.  
                                                 
3 Croatia has ratified international anti-corruption conventions and harmonized national legislation accordingly; 
corruption is treated as a criminal act. 
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Several studies on trust in institutions in Croatia (Baloban and Rimac, 1999; Štulhofer, 
2004) refer to the past period (1997 and 1995 to 2003, respectively). In light of the 
increased number of corruption scandals and intensified efforts to combat corruption in 
Croatia, one could suppose that general public views on both corruption and institutions 
have changed. Further, previous research dealt either with a general sense of trust or trust 
in various kinds of institutions, while there was no particular focus on anti-corruption 
agencies and institutions.  
 
Notwithstanding that both informal and formal institutions4 shape public attitudes 
towards corruption, in our empirical research we have collected data on trust in formal 
institutions (agencies enforcing legislative anti-corruption measures). The surveyed 
corruption experiences refer to bribes citizens gave to public employees in money, goods 
or counter-favors above the official cost of the public service. Our focus on these aspects 
of corruption and associated trust in institutions was driven by the conceptual 
development of the survey methodology, which is described in the following section. 
 
 
3 Methodology of Surveying Corruption in Croatia 
 
Assessing corruption perceptions and corruption experiences was part of the “Survey on 
use of public services and public integrity” for which the pilot testing was conducted in 
Croatia in June 2010. The net sample size for the pilot was 150 respondents of age 18 to 
64. The pilot survey was conducted by face-to-face interviews in three different regions of 
Croatia (urban and rural areas of Zagreb, Osijek and Split). The main survey followed in 
July and August 2010 on a nationally representative sample of 3005 Croatian citizens 
aged 18 to 64. The survey sample was defined by random selection of 
addresses/households and random selection of respondents. The interviewer chose the 
member of the household to be interviewed with the help of the birthday-key method.  
 
The first step in convincing respondents to participate in the survey was to secure overall 
confidence in the project. A cover letter pointed out the distinguished partners in the 
project (legally neutral international institutions and local research experts). Further, 
respondents were informed that the data collected would be treated confidentially and 
the respondents would remain anonymous. 
 
In the introductory letter, the project was presented as an effort to collect information on 
citizens’ experiences with public services. The aim of the survey was to explore public 
integrity as a whole and to examine experiences of crime victimization. That indeed made 
corruption only a part of the survey, and allowed us to not mention corruption explicitly 
in the pilot survey cover letter. Disclosing the final purpose of the survey, although 
legitimate and meaningful, could have raised the concerns of the respondents: “The 
                                                 
4 For a definition of institutions see North, 1990. 
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objective is to collect information that will assist the Government... in fighting crime, 
inter alia, by combating corruption.” 
 
This potential obstacle was resolved by raising the competence of interviewers in 
clarifying and elaborating on how the collected information would be kept and 
processed. The risk of personal data being misused was minimized by using separate 
locations for data processing and analysis. As contracted, the market research agency 
conducting the survey on site should deliver an electronic database, but the original 
questionnaires should not be made available to the institution reporting the aggregate 
survey results. Regardless of which side the initiative comes from (citizen offering a bribe 
or public official asking for a bribe), both sides involved in a corrupt activity legally are 
considered to have committed a criminal act. A final measure of security assurance 
involved checking with the anti-corruption agencies in Croatia that there was no 
legislative possibility of evidence being requested regarding the personal accounts of 
corruption in the survey. 
 
In designing the questionnaire, one had to consider that the respondents would be aware 
that their participation in corrupt transactions might discredit their integrity. Therefore 
the wording of the questions about personal corruption experiences implied that the 
initiative did not come from the respondents (e.g., “... you had to give a gift”, “... you had 
to make such an extra payment”). This solution was expected to relieve the sense of guilt 
and consequently to encourage respondents to provide true answers to sensitive 
questions.  
 
The questionnaire was structured in eight sections. Section 1 collected opinions on 
selected topics regarding the problems facing Croatia today, perceptions on corruption 
prevalence and attitudes towards corruption phenomena. Experiences with public services 
and citizens’ satisfaction in contacts with various civil servants and public officials were 
examined in Section 2. Bribery experiences were questioned in Section 3. Specifically, 
respondents were asked about their recent personal involvement in corruption acts, types 
of bribery and related purpose. For those who had had corruption experiences in the last 
12 months, we were interested to know whether they had reported the cases of corruption 
and what the outcomes were. Other practices such as corruption related to elections or 
public sector hiring practices as well as opinions on the integrity of public officials were 
surveyed in Section 4. Reasons for (not) reporting corruption and trust in institutions 
were explored in Section 5 of the questionnaire. Section 6 represented a victimization 
survey, asking about experiences of car theft, burglary, personal theft, assault, theft, and 
robbery. General information on the respondent’s sex, age, education, occupation, and 
income was collected in Section 7. The last section, Section 8, contained an interview 
evaluation by the interviewer, indicating the respondent’s remarks during or after the 
interview. Given the described questionnaire structure, we have selected those questions 
and answers that give us insight into confidentiality issues of the survey and reporting 
corruption. 
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4 Empirical Analysis Results 
 
4.1 Pilot Survey Solutions to Confidentiality Issues 
 
Already in the pilot survey, an important methodological concern was resolved as no 
major quitting problem had been observed in the corruption experience section of the 
questionnaire. One could suppose at that point that the respondents felt confident due 
to the carefully developed questionnaire and professionally trained interviewers.  
 
At the end of the pilot interview, respondents had an opportunity to give blank remarks 
on the survey. Most of the remarks were concerns expressed regarding the future use of 
the results (7 respondents) and regarding the confidentiality of the survey (3 
respondents). Two respondents were worried about the potential misuse of the 
victimization part of the survey data (whether information on home security would be 
abused by burglars), indicating that a possible leakage of data collected has been 
perceived as a problem. The pilot testing results conclusively supported the survey 
questionnaires and methodology developed. No problems arose related to the sensitive 
questions on corruption experiences, and some confidentiality issues proved to be 
irrelevant for the response rate. Since no differences have been observed in responses by 
face-to-face interview vs. partial self-administration of the questionnaire, this particular 
confidentiality issue could be disregarded. 
 
Over 17 percent of respondents claimed they had recent corruption experiences, and 
provided further details on those transactions. One could therefore assume that no major 
underreporting problem would bias the results of the subsequent large survey. We 
proceed to the empirical analysis of survey results on reporting corruption experiences 
and related trust in the institutions in Croatia. 
 
 
4.2 Survey Results on Reporting Corruption 
 
In order to better understand the current situation and to frame the context of the 
survey, several introductory questions were posed. According to the respondents, 
unemployment (26 percent) and poor performance of the Government (24 percent) are 
considered to be the major problems that Croatia is facing today, which is 
understandable given the economic crisis. Corruption is a major problem in Croatia for 
24 percent of respondents and according to public perceptions there are no signs of 
improvement. On the contrary, 44 percent of respondents think the level of corruption 
has remained the same, while 47 percent believe corruption has increased in the last three 
years.  
 
Although the perceived level of corruption is still rather high, the actual experiences of 
Croatian citizens show promising outcomes. Eighty-six percent of respondents who had 
contacts with public employees in the last 12 months did not have to give any gift, 
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counter-favor or extra money to a civil servant or public official. Of those who had 
recent corruption experiences, in 92 percent of the cases respondents claimed they had 
given such a gift to doctors and/or nurses. In contacts with health sector employees it is 
generally considered a custom for the patient to offer a small thank-you gift (a packet of 
coffee or a box of chocolate), and such gifts usually do not substantially determine the 
accessibility of health services or their quality. To a lesser extent bribes were given to 
police officers (30 percent of corruption cases) and for car registration (14 percent). It is 
worth noticing that in most of those cases the incentive came from the bribe-giver who 
voluntarily offered a bribe to avoid fines, for example. Negligible corruption experiences 
have been reported in contacts with custom officers, public utility services, tax 
authorities, local government, social protection services, teachers and professors, judges 
and prosecutors, or cadastre officers (5 to 20 individual cases per public service sector). 
 
From the selected questions and the distribution of answers, one could tell that reporting 
on corruption experiences in our survey posed no problem to the respondents in general. 
Yet, of 296 of the total respondents who had a recent corruption experience, only six 
persons reported the case formally to the police (2), prosecutor5 (2), anti-corruption 
agency (1) and ombudsperson (1). 
 
Figure 1  Reasons for Not Reporting Personal Corruption Experience 
2
3
3
17
24
24
26
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Don’t know to whom should I report
Other
Fear of reprisal
It is a common practice to pay or give gifts,
why should I report?
It is useless, nobody would care for it
I made payment/gift as a sign of gratitude
I received a benefit from the payment/gift
In %
 
 
Note: Respondents who had a corruption experience in the last 12 months but did not report it; n=290. 
Source: Survey on use of public services and public integrity in Croatia. 
 
 
When asked why they did not report the personal corruption experience to relevant 
institutions, half of the respondents stated they had gained benefits from the bribe or 
                                                 
5 State Attorney's Office. 
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had given the bribe as a sign of gratitude (Figure 1). Further, 24 percent of the 
respondents do not believe that anything useful would be done upon reporting. This last 
statement is supported by the bitter experience of several respondents who have 
submitted reports on corruption experiences, but with no results. Out of the total six 
citizens’ reports submitted on corruption experiences, five haven’t had any follow-up by 
officials. Moreover, a fear of reprisal was a reason for worry for 3 percent of respondents.  
 
Besides a very high level of opportunism, those statements indicate there might be a 
substantial distrust in the institutions regarding their willingness and efficiency to fight 
corruption. However, some people tend to share their corruption experiences informally, 
either because they feel as victims or to advise someone to give a bribe as a way to solve a 
problem. Seventi-one percent of participants in corruption acts did talk about them with 
their family or friends. None of them talked to NGOs and only one person reported the 
case of corruption to the media. Twenty-nine percent did not talk about it to anybody. 
Although their reasons remain unknown, assumed reasons such as feeling embarrassed, 
concern of moral judgement, and fear of persecution, public investigation or 
criminalization might deter people from reporting corruption, formally and informally. 
 
 
4.3 Public Views on Reporting Corruption and Trust in Institutions 
 
Better insight into the aforementioned issues is provided by the survey results on 
reporting hypothetic corruption experiences. Regardless of whether respondents had 
personal corruption experiences or not, their views about reporting corruption strongly 
support two worrying assumptions. More than half of all respondents in our sample 
think that people who report corruption are likely to regret it (55 percent of respondents 
fully agree and agree), and that sometimes corruption is the only way to get things done 
(53 percent). In line with the prevailing opinion, the simple majority of respondents 
disagree or fully disagree with the three other statements (Table 1). 
 
Table 1  General Opinions on Reporting Corruption 
Fully agree and agree 
Statement 
% Attitude 
Disagree and 
fully disagree 
% 
People who report corruption are likely to regret it 55 Intimidated 40 
Sometimes corruption is the only way to get things done 53 Affirmative 44 
There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful 
will be done about it 
47 Resigned 51 
Nobody knows where to report corruption acts 44 Not interested 52 
It is common practice to pay or give gifts, why should I report? 31 Dismissive 67 
 
Notes: Total sample including those who had no corruption experience in the last 12 months; n=3005. Omitted values 
refer to “I don't know” answers (4.5 percent). 
Source of original data: “Survey on use of public services and public integrity in Croatia”.  
 
 
 15 
Respondents’ attitudes towards each of the statements about reporting corruption are 
classified in five descriptive categories. If it is the widespread perception of the 
population that people reporting corruption would most likely regret it afterwards, one 
could assume that citizens sharing this opinion would not report corruption. Although 
the survey data did not enable us to get into the background reasons for an 
“intimidated” attitude, one could assume that the regret to which the respondents were 
referring is related to nuisance (such as media exposure, complicated follow-up 
procedures, formal investigation, and testimony at court) and/or fear (of reprisal or 
criminalization).  
 
An “affirmative” attitude is shared by 53 percent of respondents who see corruption as a 
mechanism to ensure the delivery of public services. Corruption functioning as a 
greasing wheel in conditions of inefficient public administration is well examined in the 
literature, since the early works of Leff (Leff, 1964). However, there is a wide consensus 
about the adverse effects of corruption prevailing (Mauro, 1995; Tanzi, 1998). Fighting 
the greasing wheel of corruption is related to improving public administration efficiency, 
which is the focus of interest of any good governance policy. In the context of this study, 
however, respondents would not report corruption because they either approve it as a 
state of fact or they feel helpless in contacts with a growing bureaucracy. Corruption 
practices revealed by the survey are in favor of the first statement. Corruption cases 
surveyed revealed remarkable opportunism of bribe-givers (bribes were given as a sign of 
gratitude, to by-pass the costs, to avoid fines, to get extra benefits, etc.). Corruption acts 
initiated by the bribe-givers explain the affirmative attitude towards corruption as a tool 
to “resolve issues”.  
 
The majority of respondents disagreed with the last three statements on reporting 
corruption (Table 1). The largest majority of respondents reject the statement that 
corruption is not worth reporting because bribing is common practice. The counter-
opinion (shared by 31 percent of respondents) might look similar to the interest-driven 
“affirmative” view, but the “dismissive” attitude is substantially different. Whereas the 
former approves committing bribes for the personal gain of the bribe-giver, the latter 
might consider gifts a harmless and trivial common practice. This explanation is 
supported by the survey data on the practice of giving small thank-you gifts to doctors 
and nurses. For the encouraging majority of respondents who would not tolerate giving 
bribes or gifts and consequently would report such immoral behavior, zero tolerance to 
corruption is observed. This might be attributed to the recently intensified combat 
against corruption in Croatia. 
 
About half of the respondents are in favor of the statements that (i) corruption is not 
worth reporting because nothing useful will be done about it, and (ii) people are not 
informed about where to report cases of corruption. These observations call for careful 
rethinking on the role and efficiency of the official institutions. People in Croatia might 
be resigned and disappointed with the course of the combat against corruption. As large 
corruption scandals were revealed, the investigation and prosecution that followed may 
not be seen as efficient and fast enough from the public point of view. The evidenced 
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“missing information on where to report corruption” reflects people’s ignorance and lack 
of interest to report corruption. Citizens do have the possibility to report corruption to a 
number of institutions. They can liberally choose whether to contact official anti-
corruption agencies via phone, e-mail, fax, mail, in person, or anonymously. Such 
contact numbers are provided by the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior, 
USKOK Office,6 Transparency International Croatia, tax authorities, and many others.7 
Reporting corruption to the police is within the reach of every Croatian citizen.  
 
When asked: “If in the future you have to report a case where you were requested to pay 
some extra money or give a gift to a public official, who would you report it to?”, the 
respondents’ first choice was the police (29 percent), followed by the State Attorney’s 
Office (15 percent). Since USKOK is well known as a special office for fighting 
corruption and organized crime within the State Attorney’s Office, the police and 
USKOK seem to be the natural choices as official institutions to deal with reported 
corruption. Fourteen percent of total respondents would report the case to the supervisor 
of the corrupt public official, thus expressing their confidence in internal anti-corruption 
procedures rather than in official crime-fighting institutions (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2  First Choice Institutions to Report Potential Corruption Experience 
              in the Future, n=3005 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Other
Ombudsperson
Anti-corruption NGO
Nobody
I don’t know
Journalist/media
Anti-corruption agency
Supervisor of the corrupt official
Prosecutor
Police
In %
 
 
Source: Survey on use of public services and public integrity in Croatia. 
 
 
In the victimization part of the survey, respondents described their recent exposure to 
various types of crime other than corruption. In the last three years, most of the crimes 
referred to personal theft (311), assaults or threats (202), burglary (90), robbery (48), and 
car theft (28). As shown in Figure 3, Croatian citizens are willing to report those types of 
crime to the police. Car theft was always reported to the police, probably for insurance 
                                                 
6 Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime. 
7 www.antikorupcija.hr. 
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and deregistration needs. Burglary and robbery were reported in about two thirds of the 
cases, most likely when significant damage occurred. Half of the total personal theft cases 
were reported, presumably depending on the loss. Assaults and threats were reported to a 
smaller extent. 
 
Figure 3  Reporting Rates per Type of Crime in Croatia 
Crime type and % of reported cases
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Bribery 2
Assaults/threats 40
Personal theft 50
Robbery 65
Burglary 68
Car theft 100
Number of cases
Reported Not reported
 
 
Note: Bribery experience refers to cases in the last 12 months, reported to official institutions; other forms of crime refer to 
experiences in the last 36 months, reported to the police. 
Source: Survey on use of public services and public integrity in Croatia. 
 
 
This research evidenced a strong reluctance of citizens to report corruption to official 
institutions for various (more or less) rational reasons. The police and USKOK are 
perceived as the most trustworthy institutions to report corruption in Croatia, and the 
police stands as the primary institution to contact when reporting other forms of crime 
in Croatia. 
 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Corruption is widespread in Croatia and curbing corruption is one of the major tasks of 
the Croatian government on its path of accession to the European Union (Budak, 2006). 
Surveying Croatian citizens about the integrity of public services as well as examining 
public opinions on perceptions and corruption experiences are expected to strengthen 
anti-corruption efforts.8 
 
Therefore it is of the utmost importance not only to conduct surveys, but to convince 
respondents – ordinary citizens – to provide honest and sincere answers to sensitive 
                                                 
8 Even though the survey reveals “petty” administrative corruption and does not capture “grand” political corruption. 
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questions. This issue has been identified in the existing empirical research literature on 
corruption (Treisman, 2007), but has not been addressed in the context of misuse of 
personal data of respondents and taking into account the potential risk of surveillance. 
In this regard, assessing the risk of data leakage and misuse that could lead to greater 
underreporting of corruption experiences in surveys was for us rather limited. The 
confidence in ICT technologies used in the survey process leaves room for future research 
as well.  
 
Underreporting corruption experiences does not prove to stand as an issue in the survey. 
Of course, one cannot ever tell if and to what extent the corruption experiences have 
been underreported or drive conclusions on the real corruption numbers. A major 
concern of respondents, even in limited scope, has been expressed regarding the final and 
true purpose for which the data will be used afterwards. This intuitively indicates a lack 
of trust in the institutions rather than fear of being surveilled. It also reveals (but to a 
modest extent) a fear of whether the personal data provided in the survey would remain 
anonymous, although the anonymity of the respondents was protected more than 
requested by standard market research procedures.  
 
Survey data provided insight into Croatian citizens’ everyday experiences in contacts with 
the public sector. Our unique focus on corruption experiences and related reporting 
issues portrayed to some extent whether people in Croatia feel secure in this cumbersome 
area and properly protected by the responsible institutions. The significant reluctance to 
report corruption observed in Croatia can be mainly attributed to the very high level of 
opportunism and lack of trust in the institutions. About two thirds of respondents with 
corruption experiences think that corruption is a standard form of behavior, and the 
simple majority of all respondents consider it pointless to report corruption to official 
institutions. 
 
Policy implications to combat corruption should primarily be targeted at strengthening 
anti-corruption awareness, i.e., changing public attitudes. In eliminating administrative 
corruption it is of the utmost importance to convince citizens that even a small thank-
you gift should be considered corruption, and that any form of corrupt activity seriously 
distorts accessibility to public services. Administrative “petty” corruption goes hand in 
hand with “grand” political corruption and they interchangeably form a vicious circle of 
systemic corruption in the society. Carefully designed public campaigns, promoting 
current efforts of anti-corruption institutions to the media and citizens, and more widely 
publicizing corruption hotlines and addresses for reporting corruption (in particular in 
rural regions and among elderly people), would contribute to the success of anti-
corruption efforts and to building public trust in the institutions. Strict implementation 
and monitoring of ethical codes of conduct in public administration would benefit the 
eradication of administrative corruption as well. Once citizens witness more corruption-
free public services, their perceptions of the overall corruption prevalence in Croatia will 
consequently become lower. 
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